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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
1.

Robert Troy Jensen, Plaintiff, is an individual claiming one or more

instances of medical malpractice by the Defendant.
2.

Scott Smith, M.D., Defendant, is an individual practicing medicine within

the State of Utah, who performed the medical procedure in question.
3.

John Does 1-100 are Defendants, whose identities and true names and

capacities are at this time unknown, and whose true identities will become known
throughout the course of this litigation.
II.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction before this Court is proper pursuant to the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals over the decisions of the Trial Courts of the State of Utah. Const.
Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-l; Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 1995, 904 P.2d
677; U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-l.
III.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellant asserts that Rule 56(f) properly allows a party to file an affidavit stating
reasons why the party is presently unable to submit evidentiary affidavits in opposition to
the moving party's supporting affidavits, and by so doing avoid Summary Judgment.
Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). As such, Appellant's
1

reliance on Rule 56(f) was proper in their defense of the defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the Trial Court improperly dismissed this action for failure to
designate an expert witness.
In the alternative, Appellant asserts that designation of an expert witness is not
necessary where the negligence of the Defendant may be presumed. Collins v. Utah State
Developmental Center. 992 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1999). As such, Appellant maintains
that the Trial Court improperly granted Summary Judgment in the foregoing suit upon the
grounds that Plaintiff could not make a prima facie case of negligence without an expert.
Pete v. Youngblood. 141 P.3d 629 (Utah App. 2006).
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Hizsins
v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231. 233 (Utah 1993). The review of a District Court's
Rule 56(f) discovery findings is for an abuse of discretion. Grynbers v. Questar Pipeline
Co.. 2003 UT 8,H 56,70 P.3d 1.
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Const. Art. 8, § 1.

2.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, §78-2a-l.

3.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, §78-14-8.
2

4.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, §63-30d-202.

5.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26.

6.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.

7.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8.

8.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9.
VI.
STATEMENT OF CASE

Appellant/Plaintiff filed their Complaint December 5, 2003, alleging negligence
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the same was answered by the
Defendant January 12, 2004. No scheduling conference had ever been agreed upon
between the parties, and no discovery deadlines had ever been ordered by the Trial Court.
On March 23, 2006, Defendant filed their designation of an expert witness. On
April 24, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion asserted
that due to Plaintiffs failure to designate an expert witness, negligence could not be
established, and Judgment was proper as a matter of law. On May 22, 2006, the
Defendant filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion.

That

Memorandum requested that the Court allow sixty (60) days for the designation of an
expert witness. On May 26, 2006, Defendant filed their reply Memorandum along with
their Request to Submit the Motion for decision. On or about August 11, 2006, Plaintiff
filed the affidavit of Barry E. Gustin, M.D., as well as a Designation of Expert Witness.

3

On August 23, 2006, the Trial Court granted the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. In that ruling the Court held that Plaintiffs reliance upon Rule
56(f) was improper, and that a request for an extension of time under Rule 6(b)(2) was
the proper Motion to have been brought. The Court further held that the failure to
designate an expert within the 270 days required under the 1999 Amendments to Rule
26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precluded Plaintiff from being able to
establish the elements of negligence.
From this order, Plaintiff respectfully appeals.
VIL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff entered into a doctor-patient relationship with the Defendant and received
a below the knee amputation (BKA) from Defendant on or about May 3, 2006.
Defendant failed to leave sufficient tissue to wrap over the end of the remaining portion
of leg, and instead used a midline stitch along the center of the leg in an attempt to close
the wound. Such a procedure prevented Plaintiff from properly being able to use
prosthesis, and led to the infection in the wound. The wound required further treatment
and wound flushing at Dixie Regional. Ultimately, a staph infection developed and
Plaintiff was admitted to the emergency room with chest pain, nausea, vomiting, and
finally a stump revision surgery was performed on or about June 29, 2001. In this
procedure, physicians removed further portions of the Plaintiffs leg, this time leaving the

4

requisite portion of skin to wrap over the end of the remaining stump of the leg. Several
CT brain scans were performed to monitor the effects of the staph infection, and finally
Plaintiff left the Defendant's care to receive care from the Wound Clinic in St. George.
VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

Plaintiff s/Appellant's reliance on Rule 56(f) in response to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment v.a:> pm|K'' -itul ludpuenl O'uld n«<l l»e entned )• a
matter of law. Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp.. 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1997).
2.

Summary Judgment cannot be granted as a matter of law first because of

the facts dial gi\T rise l\ die piesiiinplMii i>l neglige^
loquitur, which does not require the designation vi an

. doctrine of res ipsa
••.•••'• witness.

Pete v.

Youmblood. 141 P.3d 629 (Utah App. 2006).
IX.
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiffs Reliance on Rule 56(f) in Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment was Proper.
As a general rule a sin/le s\\ oi n statement thai neates a genuine issue of material
fact is sufficient to avoid Summary Judgment. Webster v. Sill. 1983, 675 V ?<1 1170.
Also, in the case of medical malpractice, Utah has adopted the view that an expert is
necessai v to rxtuhlisii negligence execpl where negligence can be presumed. Pete v.
Youmblood. 141 P.3d 629 (Utah App. 2006). However, it has not been established that
5

the sworn statement under the holding of Webster necessarily be that of the designated
expert in a medical malpractice case.
In the case at hand, no expert was designated by either party until after the default
deadlines imposed by the 1999 Amendments to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, the Affidavit presented May 19, 2006, by Matthew T. Graff
established the requirements under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
effectively precludes Summary Judgment pending the production of such an Affidavit.
(f) When Affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P.
The Affidavit of Plaintiffs prospective expert witness was then later provided
August 11, 2006, which precludes Summary Judgment under Rule 56(e) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Whether or not that Affidavit will be allowed to serve as the testimony
of an expert witness to establish negligence is not yet ripe for adjudication. But an
Affidavit sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact was provided.
As such, Summary Judgment rule should not be used where there are issues of fact
in dispute. Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co.. 1967, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 758.
More specifically, Summary Judgment is inappropriate where there are disputed issues of
material fact. Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.. 1970, 24 Utah 2d 277,470 P.2d 261.

6

11 is tun* linn to hau" sueh ,m txpati designated after the passing of the deadline
will require a Motion under Rule 6(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Ci v il Pi c icedure.
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was
the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time
for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and
(e), and 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions
stated in them. Rule 6(b)(2) U.R.C.P.
However, such a Motion has neither been granted nor denied. All that has been
presented is the tequisite Affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) requesting that additional time
be granted to procure an Affidavit

In essence, the onlei of Ihe "I nal < "ocml vwb premature

in anticipating that it would deny a subsequent Motion under Rule 6(b)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting an extension of time to designate an expert. But for
the purposes

idgment, the proper request had been made to

provide further sworn statements, and a subsequent sworn ^tniemeni \ww [inHided us
required under Webster v. Sill 1983, 675 P.2d 1170.
11 is likely dial n Million for an Extension of time to designate an expert will be
filed shortly pursuant to Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil hoeaiiiH , which will determine
whether or not the Affidavit filed August 11, 2006 is sufficient to serve as an expert
witness report to establish negligence. It is also clear that the discretion of the Trial
Court in granting or denying such a Motion is hi aid

Sec, eg. DeBrv v. Cascade

Enterprises. 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994). Until that time, however, a request under Rule
V)(f) was properly made, and, sworn, statements have been presented which present
genuine issues of nialeiial fkl

As such, this ease is not one ripe for Summary Judgment,
7

which could not have been granted based upon a lack of specific facts showing an issue
for trial. It must be remembered that Summary Judgment should be granted only when it
clearly appears that there are no issues of material fact in dispute which if resolved in
favor of adverse party would entitle him to prevail. Russell v. Park City Utah Corp..
1973,29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274. The issue of material fact as to whether or not the
Defendant breached the standard of care may be resolved in favor of the Plaintiff if a
subsequent Motion is made and granted under Rule 6(b) allowing the use of Plaintiffs
expert, and the trier of fact is then persuaded by the Affidavit presented by the Plaintiff
on August 11, 2006. Under such a set of circumstances, the Plaintiff would prevail, and
thus Summary Judgment is not proper.
The trial relied on the holding of Johnson v. Hermes in granting Summary
Judgment. However, that holding declared that a request for additional discovery is not
proper in responding to a Summary Judgment motion. Johnson v. Hermes Assocs. 128
P.3d 1151,1158 (Utah 2005). As such, Plaintiff did not request additional discovery, but
rather properly opposed the Motion through Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. In that case the nonmoving party merely asserted that additional discovery was necessary, but had provided
no sworn statements in satisfaction of Rule 56(e) or 56(f).
In contrast, our case is one where all necessary facts and sworn statements to show
a genuine issue of material fact were presented prior to the Summary Judgment Ruling,
but it is yet to be shown if such sworn statements will be able to be considered expert
testimony pending a subsequent Motion under Rule 6(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil
8

Procedure. But for the purposes of Summary Judgment, it must be conceded that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. For such reasons, the Summary Judgment ruling of
the Trial Court was improper and should be REVERSED.
II. Summary Judgment Cannot be Granted as a Matter of Law as Facts Give
Rise to the Presumption of Negligence Under the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, Which Does not Require the Designation of an Expert Witness.
Utah Courts have specifically held that, "(t)ypically, the standard of care and the
defendant's breach of that standard must be established through expert testimony.
(Citation Omitted) The courts of this state, however, have long recognized an exception
to this requirement: 'Specifically, expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the
standard of care owed the Plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within
the common knowledge and experience of the layman.9" Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d
629,636 (Utah App. 2006).
Furthermore, that case held that Res Ipsa Loquitur need not be pled for the
doctrine to be applied in surviving Summary Judgment motions. Id at 638. Rather, in
any case where the elements of Res Ipsa Loquitur may be found, the designation of an
expert witness is not necessary to proceed to trial. Those elements were enumerated in
that case as follows:
(1) — [t]he accident was of a kind which in the ordinary
course of events, would not have happened had the
defendant(s) used due care, (2) the instrument or thing
causing the injury was at the time of the accident under the
management and control of the defendant, and (3) the
accident happened irrespective of any participation at the time
by the plaintiff.
9

In the case at hand, too much skin was removed from the leg to allow the Plaintiff
to use a prosthesis, and the resulting infection, injuries, and multiple surgeries were the
result. The instrument causing such injury was the surgery performed by the Defendant,
and the Plaintiff was under general anesthetic at the time of the surgery and thus had no
participation in the action. Leg amputees require prostheses. Leg prostheses place
pressure on the site of the amputation. An open wound at the site of that pressure
precludes the use of prosthesis. Thus, to remove the skin needed to use prosthesis
constitutes negligence. Such a conclusion does not require expert testimony, but rather,
that conclusion "is such that people would know from common knowledge and
experience it is more probably than not the result of negligence." IdjA 637.
Whether or not Plaintiff would prevail under a theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur is not
at issue in this appeal. Rather, such a doctrine could be applied so as to raise a genuine
issue of material fact for trial, and Summary Judgment was thus improper. For such
reasons, the holding of the Trial Court should be REVERSED.
X.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff properly relied on Rule 56(f) to overcome Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff first provided the Court with a sworn statement warranting
a continuance for Plaintiff to provide an Affidavit under Rule 56(e). Despite the lack of
an ordered continuance by the Trial Court, Plaintiff still provided the Trial Court a sworn
statement in accordance with Rule 56(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, a
10

genuine issue of material fact existed according to the sworn statements provided by the
parties.
In the alternative, if reliance upon Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
was improper, Plaintiff has presented a fact scenario an injury such that people would
know from common knowledge and experience it is more probably than not the result of
negligence. As such, Plaintiff is not required to provide an expert to testify regarding the
standard of care pursuant to the holding of Pete v. Youn2blood. 141 P.3d 629, 636 (Utah
App. 2006).
DATED this 13th day of December 2006.
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES

"Matthew T. Graff
Z-^
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Karen Wray, Paralegal, hereby certify that on the 13th day of December
2006,1 caused to be mailed, U.S. first-class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing Appellate Brief, to the following:
David H. Epperson
David C. Epperson
EPPERSON & RENCHER
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
10 West 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Karen Wray, Paralegal

12

ADDENDUM
1. Findings of Fact (see Memorandum Decision)
2. Memorandum Decision
3. Final Order (see Memorandum Decision)

13

'I.FO

hi

M

ifmzi
K

PMSJ 00

-" t « COUHTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT TROY JENSEN,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFANDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 030502250

SCOTT SMITH, M.D.,

Judge Eric A. Ludlow

r

Defendant.

In this medical malpractice suit, the defendant, Dr. Scott Smith, has filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing that the the plaintiff, Robert Jensen, has failed to make out a prima
facie case of medical negligence.
BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed:
1 Following Dr. Smith's amputation of Jensen's left leg below the knee, Jensen's
amputation stump did not heal properly. After multiple unsuccessful attempts by Dr. Smith to
treat the stump so that it would heal properly, Jensen had his leg amputated above the knee by
another physician.
2 On December 5,2003, Jensen filed a complaint alleging negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Smith.

AUO 2 5 2006 J

3. On January 12,2004, Dr. Smith filed an answer.
4. At no time have the parties to this action conducted a scheduling conference to fix
discovery deadlines or otherwise discuss the matters contemplated by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
5. On March 23, 2006, Dr. Smith filed his designation of expert witnesses.
6. On April 24,2006, Dr. Smith filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Dr.
Smith argues that Jensen is unable to establish negligence because he has failed to designate any
expert witnesses to testify regarding the elements of negligence. In a supporting affidavit, one of
Dr. Smith's expert witnesses, Dr. Timothy C. Beals, testifies that Dr. Smith satisfied the relevant
standard of care in his treatment of Jensen.
7. On May 22, 2006, Jensen filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. Jensen cites Rule 56(f) and requests that the Court allow him 60 days to
designate an expert witness. In a supporting affidavit, Jensen's counsel states that "[discovery
has not been completed within the time allotted by Rule 26 U.R.C.P. because of the complexity
of this case." The nature of the claimed complexity is not explained, but Jensen's counsel states
that he has been "playing 'phone tag',f with an expert witness in an effort to obtain the expert's
final report, including the expert's written opinion, previously expressed to Jensen's counsel in a
telephone conversation, that Dr. Smith's treatment of Jensen fell below the relevant standard of

2

care.1
8. On May 26,2006, Dr. Smithfileda reply attributing the delay in completing
discovery to Jensen's willful inaction. Also on this date, Dr. Smithfileda request to submit the
motion for summary judgment for decision.2
ANALYSIS

As Dr. Smith has noted, the establishment of medical negligence generally requires
expert testimony. Dallev v. Utah Valley Ree'l Med. Ctr.. 791 P.2d 193,195-96 (Utah 1990)
(citing general rule and noting res ipsa loquitur exception); Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health
Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987) (citing rule). Jensen does not argue against the
application of the general rule in this case. Accordingly, if Jensen is unable to designate an

1

In the memorandum opposing Dr. Smith's motion, Jensen asserts that he had "obtained
a statementfroma [mjedical [e]xpert," but that "within the last 2 weeks before thefilingof [Dr.
Smith's summary judgment motion], the expert informed [Jensen's] counsel that he would be
unable to expertly testify on [Jensen's] behalf." Mem. in Opp. to Summ. J. at 4. It is possible, of
course, that this unidentified expert is different from the unidentified expert with whom Jensen's
counsel is allegedly "playing 'phone tag,'" but nowhere is this ambiguity clarified. Nevertheless,
for purposes of the instant motion, it will be assumed that the affidavit and the memorandum
reference two different experts.
2

On June 2, 2006, Jensen filed an objection to the request to submit and requested oral
argument on the motion for summary judgment. The governing law here is sufficiently well
established to obviate the need for oral argument. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e) ("The court shall
grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the
action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided'') (emphasis added).
3

expert witness, Dr. Smith is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Arnold v. Curtis, 846
P.2d 1307,1309-10 (Utah 1993) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant doctor
where, among other things, plaintiff was preventedfromintroducing expert testimony due to
belated designation of expert).
Rule 26 governs the discovery process. Several provisions are relevant to the instant
matter. Subsection (f)(1) requires the parties to meet for the purpose of, among other things,
devising a discovery plan:
The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet
in person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and
defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or
arrange for the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(1), and to develop a
stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the meeting. The
attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good faith
to agree upon the discovery plan.
Subsection (f)(2) details the information to be included in the discovery plan. Subsection
(f)(3) requires that the plaintiffs counsel submit a proposed order reflecting the parties'
discovery plan "to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any event no more than 60
days after the first answer isfiled[.]MAs the Advisory Committee Note for the 1999 Discovery
Rules Amendments explains: "The deadline for filing the stipulated discovery plan effectively
limits the time for the conference to within 46 days after the first answer is filed."
It is undisputed that the parties here have not had the meeting required by Subsection

4

(f)(1). It is also undisputed that no proposed scheduling order reflecting the parties' discovery
plan has been submitted to the Court as required by Subsection (f)(3). Under the plain language
of the Rule, the deadlines for the performance of these acts have now passed.3
Other deadlines have also passed. The 1999 amendments "establish default deadlines and
limits to govern those cases in which the parties cannot agree to a discovery plan and do not seek
a judicial order[.]ff Advisory Committee Note. Such is the case before the Court. Subsection (d)
provides: "Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discovery shall
be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed." Subsection (a)(3) provides for the
disclosure of information regarding expert witnesses, including the identity of such witnesses.
Subsection (a)(3)(C) provides: "Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the
expiration of fact discovery as provided by Subdivision (d)[.]"
Under the plain language of the Rule, then, in the absence of a stipulation or order from
the Court, the deadline for Jensen's designation of expert witnesses expired 270 days after Dr.
Smithfiledhis answer on January 12, 2004. There can be no question that Jensen failed to meet
this deadline. Jensen's counsel acknowledged as much in his affidavit, when he stated that

3

"To help ensure the case does not stall, the rule imposes on plaintiffs counsel the
obligation to schedule the meeting and to submit to the court the discovery plan and order
resultingfromthe meeting." Advisory Committee Note.
5

"[discovery has not been completed within the time allotted by Rule 26 U.R.C.P."
In his memorandum opposing the motion for summary judgment, Jensen has requested
additional time for discovery under Rule 56(f). Rule 56(f) allows for additional discovery under
certain circumstances, but that is not the proper provision under which to seek an extension of
time.4 Rule 6(b) governs such extensions, and provides, in pertinent part:
When by these rules . . . an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with
or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made
before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a
previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect....
Because the 270-day period established by Rule 26(a)(3)(C) had expired by the time
Jensen requested additional time for the designation of his experts, Subsection (2) governs. The
plain language of Subsection (2) requires that a motion be made in order for the Court to grant an
extension of time. No such motion has been made here.5 Consequently, the Court is unable to
4

Additionally, it should be noted that Jensen has not filed a Rule 56(f) motion, but has
only cited to Rule 56(f) and requested additional discovery. "A request for additional discovery
is not, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a proper counter to factual assertions.
Moreover, the proper means of requesting additional discovery would have been to file a motion
for additional discovery rather than to use the request as a challenge to summary judgment."
Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 128 P.3d 1151,1158 (Utah 2005).
5

See Holmes Dev.. LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895,909-10 (Utah 2002) (request to amend
complaint that was not made in an actual motion accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities stating with particularity the grounds upon which the motion should be granted was
6

grant Jensen's request.
Moreover, even if Jensen's request failing to cite Rule 6(b) constitutes a motion under
that rule, he has not made the showing necessary to allow the Court to grant it. The only grounds
articulated for the request are the complexity of the case and Jensen's counsel's inability to
secure an expert within the designated time period. Both of these assertions may well be true,
but Jensen has not alleged any impediment to his ability to request additional time to designate
expert witnesses prior to the expiration of the time allowed under Rule 26. He has therefore
failed to establish the "excusable neglect" required by Rule 6(b). "When more time is required
our rules provide for an extention [sic] of time upon good cause showing. When counsel is
available to request this additional time and fails to do so within the time prescribed, it seems
incongruous for him to later appear and claim excusable neglect on the basis he needed
additional time." Nunlev v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 388 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1964) (footnote
omitted).
CONCLUSION

Jensen cannot establish either of his negligence-based causes of action without expert
testimony. Jensen has not designated any experts and the deadline for such designation under
Rule 26 has long since passed. Jensen has notfileda Rule 6(b) motion requesting additional
not a motion and was properly denied); Coroles v. Sabev, 79 P.3d 974, 985 (Utah App. 2003)
(same).
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time to make such a designation, and he has not shown that his failure to make such a motion
prior to the expiration of the deadline was the result of any cause beyond his control.
Consequently, the Court cannot grant Jensen additional time in which to designate expert
witnesses. It follows that Jensen cannot make out a prima facie case of negligence against Dr.
Smith, and Dr. Smith is entitled to judgment on Jensen's claims as a matter of law.6

ORDER

1. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

n

DATED this \ ' day of August, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Eric A. Ludlow

6

This disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the factual assertions of Dr. Beals that
Dr. Smith's treatment of Jensen satisfied the standard of care of the relevant medical community.
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